

ROP

Return Oriented Programming




Announcements

- DiceCTF next Friday (Feb 4)
 - Be there!
 - Let's be top 3
 - There will be pizza
- eCTF
 - Officially started
 - Check out #eCTF on Discord if signed up
- Research - talk to us after
- TracerFire March 6




Meeting Flag

```
sigpwny{nx_who?}
```




Overview

- Stack buffer overflow review
- W^X
- ROP high level
- ROP in practice



Vulnerable program

```
int main() {  
    char buf[32];  
    gets(buf);  
}
```



Old way to solve

buf —>

This is user input!

Saved rbp —>

0xcafecafecafefff

Return address —>

0x5555555555198

Other variables from previous
function call

???

???

Lower address
(0xcafecafecafe)

```
int main() {  
    char buf[32];  
    gets(buf);  
}
```

Higher address
(0xcafecafecafe + 32 + 8 *
4)



Old way to solve

buf (now full of instructions which open a shell) —>

```
\xeb\x10\x48\x31\xc0\x5f\x48\x31
\xf6\x48\x31\xd2\x48\x83\xc0\x3b
\x0f\x05\xe8\xeb\xff\xff\xff\x2f\x62
\x69\x6e\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x90\x90
```

Saved rbp —>

0x4141414141414141

Return address —>

0xcafecafecafecafe

Other variables from previous function call

???

???

```
int main() {
    char buf[32];
    gets(buf);
}
```


Lower address
(0xcafecafecafecafe)

Higher address
(0xcafecafecafecafe + 32 + 8 * 4)



Introducing W^X

- Memory pages have permissions
 - R - read (Can you read the bytes of this memory)
 - W - write (Can you modify the bytes of this memory?)
 - X - execute (Can you jump to instructions in this memory?)
- Which permissions make most sense to apply to the stack?
- W^X philosophy
 - Write xor Execute
 - A memory page can be writable or executable, but should never be both at the same time



Old way to solve

buf (now full of instructions which open a shell)→

```
\xeb\x10\x48\x31\xc0\x5f\x48\x31
\xf6\x48\x31\xd2\x48\x83\xc0\x3b
\x0f\x05\xe8\xeb\xff\xff\xff\x2f\x62
\x69\x6e\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x90\x90
```

Saved rbp →

0x4141414141414141

Return address →

0xcafecafecafecafe

Other variables

???

???

```
int main() {
    char buf[32];
    gets(buf);
}
```

Now causes a **SEGFALT** when jumping to **0xcafecafecafecafe** because stack memory is not executable!


Lower address
(0xcafecafecafecafe)

Higher address
(0xcafecafecafecafe + 32 + 8 * 4)



ROP - Our Savior

- Code execution technique
 - Want to open a shell
- Bypasses NX (non executable) memory permissions
- Works by collecting “gadgets” and organizing them into a program



ROP - High Level

Using a sequence of gadgets, can we achieve:


$$B = 3$$

Gadget 1
 $A = A + 1$

Gadget 2
 $A = 0$

Gadget 3
 $B = A$

Gadget 4
 $C = B$



ROP - High Level

Using a sequence of gadgets, can we achieve:

$$B = 3$$

Gadget 1
 $A = A + 1$

Gadget 2
 $A = 0$

Gadget 3
 $B = A$

Gadget 4
 $C = B$

Gadget 2
Gadget 1
Gadget 1
Gadget 1
Gadget 3



ROP - High Level

Hint:
swap rax and rbx

Gadget 1
xchg rax, rbx
ret

Hint:
rbx = 0

Gadget 2
nop
xor rbx, rbx
ret

Hint:
rcx = 0
rax = rax + 1

Gadget 3
xor rcx, rcx
add rax, 1
ret

Hint:
rax = rax - rbx

Gadget 4
sub rax, rbx
nop
ret

Using a sequence of gadgets, can we achieve:

rbx = 3
(ignore the ret for now!)



ROP - High Level

Hint:
swap rax and rbx

```
Gadget 1  
xchg rax, rbx  
ret
```

Hint:
rbx = 0

```
Gadget 2  
nop  
xor rbx, rbx  
ret
```

Hint:
rcx = 0
rax = rax + 1

```
Gadget 3  
xor rcx, rcx  
add rax, 1  
ret
```

Hint:
rax = rax - rbx

```
Gadget 4  
sub rax, rbx  
nop  
ret
```

Using a sequence of gadgets, can we achieve:


rbx = 3
(ignore the ret for now!)

Gadget 2 (set rbx to 0)
Gadget 1 (set rax = rbx)
Gadget 3 (rax = 1)
Gadget 3 (rax = 2)
Gadget 3 (rax = 3)
Gadget 1 (set rbx = rax)



ROP - High Level

1. Find gadgets in program
 - a. Need gadgets that set registers
 - b. Need gadget that invokes a syscall
2. Figure out how to order gadgets to set your registers to correct values for execve syscall
3. Execute your gadgets in order!



Where to find gadgets?


- Any instructions followed by a 'ret' is a gadget
 - May not be a useful gadget, though
 - `objdump -d -M intel myprogram | grep ret -B 5`

```
000000000000011e0 <__do_global_dtors_aux>:
11e0:    f3 0f 1e fa    endbr64
11e4:    80 3d 35 2e 00 00 00    cmp     BYTE PTR [rip+0x2e35],0x0
11eb:    75 2b          jne     1218 <__do_global_dtors_aux+0x38>
11ed:    55            push   rbp
11ee:    48 83 3d 02 2e 00 00    cmp     QWORD PTR [rip+0x2e02],0x0
11f5:    00
11f6:    48 89 e5      mov     rbp,rsq
11f9:    74 0c          je      1207 <__do_global_dtors_aux+0x27>
11fb:    48 8b 3d 06 2e 00 00    mov     rdi,QWORD PTR [rip+0x2e06]
1202:    e8 a9 fe ff ff    call   10b0 <_cxa_finalize@plt>
1207:    e8 64 ff ff ff    call   1170 <deregister_tm_clones>
120c:    c6 05 0d 2e 00 00 01    mov     BYTE PTR [rip+0x2e0d],0x1
1213:    5d            pop     rbp
1214:    c3            ret
1215:    0f 1f 00      nop    DWORD PTR [rax]
1218:    c3            ret
1219:    0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00    nop    DWORD PTR [rax+0x0]
```



Vulnerable program - Second look

```
int main() {  
    char buf[32];  
    gets(buf);  
}
```



Vulnerable program - Second look

buf →

This is user input!

Saved rbp →

0xcafecafecafefff

Return address →

0x5555555555198

Other variables from previous
function call


???

???

Lower address
(0xcafecafecafe)

```
int main() {  
    char buf[32];  
    gets(buf);  
}
```

Higher address
(0xcafecafecafe + 32 + 8 *
4)



ROP pwn

buf (doesn't matter) —>

AAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAA

Saved rbp (doesn't matter) —>

0x4141414141414141

Return address —>

ADDRESS OF GADGET 1

Other variables from previous
function call


ADDRESS OF GADGET 2

ADDRESS OF GADGET 3

Lower address
(0xcafecafecafecafe)


```
int main() {  
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}
```

Higher address
(0xcafecafecafecafe + 32 + 8 *
4)




ROP - Addresses

- Find the offset of gadget in the binary using objdump.
- Next, is PIE (position independent executable) enabled?
 - If yes: Need a leak to find base of binary
 - If no: Base of binary is always the same
 - fast way to find base is to just load with gdb, then `info file`
- Add base of binary to offset found with objdump
 - This is the memory address of the gadget which you should write on the stack




ROP - In practice

- You can find gadgets with objdump and hand craft gadget list
- ... but most people just use [ROPgadget](#)
 - List gadgets
 - `./ROPgadget.py --binary myprogram`
 - Automatically create a rop chain to pop shell
 - `./ROPgadget.py --ropchain --binary myprogram`



ROP - Libc

- Small programs do not have enough gadgets to pop a shell
 - No problem, just use libc
 - LOTS of gadgets
 - Basically all programs are linked with it, trick is finding correct version
 - Good chal authors give you the libc
1. Find gadgets in libc with ROPGadget/objdump
 2. Leak libc address in running program
 3. Calculate libc base from leak
 4. Add gadget offset
 5. Write addresses to stack



Next Meetings

Sunday Seminar:

- UIUCTF Planning

Next Thursday:

- Format string vulns

